Tuesday, November 27, 2018

Mandatory Rotation of The Auditing Firm - Healthy Competition or Collective Incompetence

The two most important regulators of the word, namely, the European Commission (E.C.) in Europe and the PCAOB in the U.S. have taken very different routes to enhance the audit quality of the firms. In April 2014, EU amended the Statutory Audit Directive of 2006 to introduce provisions relating to the Mandatory Firm Rotation (MFR) to extend periodical changes to audit firms as well. However, the US decided to stick to its rule of only Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation. Three years later, in April 2017, India, through Companies Act, 2013 mandated Audit Rotation in India too.

Mandatory Audit Rotation imposes periodic breaks to audit engagements and is intended to avoid excessively long relationship between the auditor and the client. This means that listed and other public interest entities will have to bid goodbye to their long-standing auditors, put out their audit tender periodically and completely change the auditor after the prescribed period by the regulator. For audit companies, this means that they will have to chase many more new clients than they normally do and re-work on permissible activities that they can provide to their audit clients to avoid a conflict-of-interest between their other services, like consulting, and auditing.

This increased tendering environment has put a limelight on data and analytics. Statutory audit is a homogenous service defined strictly by a few hundred pages of legislation leaving very little room for differentiation. Firms are offering innovative solutions, not only as a differentiator of services being offered, but to address key business risks and inadvertently improving audit quality. The Flip side to this is that the big four, with their deep pockets, are developing new technologies at a considerable cost, effectively creating a barrier to entry for the smaller firms. It’ll be a while until the cost stabilize through innovation seep down. We can safely assume that the big four will continue their dominance, well into the new contract cycle in the coming decade.

The bottom line lies in the audit quality. Auditing quality is widely discussed and debated topic across the globe. It can be defined as the probability that an auditor will both discover and report a breach in the client's accounting system. It can potentially bring out the scam in public domain or sustain it for many years. The probability of finding fault in accounting depends on the auditor’s intellectual competence while that of reporting, depends on auditor’s independence. Audit quality being very subjective topic, can neither be quantified nor be accurately measured, but only proxies are used for its assessment.

Many countries have undergone massive transformations in its auditing practices laws. New Zealand, after Initially refraining from making reforms to its auditing profession, eventually felt threatened that the country might be excluded from international recognition of its auditors and found it necessary to impose reforms.


Key Findings after Partner Rotation in US

There are some interesting results observed when the change in audit partner takes place. For larger firms, we see a positive psychological change in perception. By analyzing the Earnings Response Coefficient, we can conclude that investors perceive the rotation of lead audit partner as enhancing audit quality. While On the other hand, for smaller firms, it is observed that their predictive value of earning for future cash flows improved to as much as 85% during the post-rotation period.

Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation- A Silver Bullet?

MAR is not a new phenomenon. It has found acceptance in other countries such as Italy (auditor term limit of 9 years), Brazil (5 years), South Korea (6 years), and India (4 years for banks, insurance companies, and public sector companies).
External or statutory audit firms keep reiterating that their business is not investigation but assessing fraud in financial statements. However, two of the biggest frauds committed in Parmalat, Italy and PNB, India show that auditor could have detected malpractices with just some due diligence in their regular work. These frauds were at similar scale of Enron and often dubbed as ‘Italy’s Enron’ and ‘India’s Enron’ respectively. In fact, the Parmalat fraud took place after the implementation of mandatory firm rotation.
Implementation of MAR or MPR is yet to have its desired effect on fraud detection. However, the question is, will MAR lead us to a serious problem that is beyond our imagination today?

Additional Concerns

  • Quality of CPAs (Certified Public Accountant Firm)
Major CPA (equivalent to CAs of India) firms usually hire bright minds from reputed B Schools. Over time, accounting as a career has started to lose its charm due to work pressure. Major CPAs are abandoning professionalism to pursue consulting profits. This implies neither proper compensation nor hope for advancement in the minds of aspiring students.  As a result, the quality of graduates joining the firms may be questionable.
  • Protecting each other’s interest
When auditing firms closely compete for the same limited pool of profitable clients, it is in their interest to protect the industry from probable disruption. This behavior has a potential to lead us towards another major financial crisis.
  • Consolidation
If major players start to consolidate to effectively level the competition, then how much consolidation can be beneficial to the market or in the interest of public? Their unquestionable dominance may make it difficult to question their remarks.

Below graph plots ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficient estimates (together with 95 percent confidence intervals) from regressions of Audit Fees and audit effort (measured as Audit Hours, Total Partner Hours, or Engagement Partner Hours) for client i in year t on five separate indicators marking the years 1 to 5 of the tenure cycle of the engagement partner. Year 3 serves as base period and lacks a coefficient estimate. The models include various audit and client-specific control variables plus fixed effects (see notes to Tables 4 and 5 for details). The sample comprises up to 17,903 client-year observations over the 2008-2014 period with PCAOB and control variable data.



-  Sagar Gogate
   Ankit Sharma
   SDA Bocconi Asia Center